Geoculture and Its Social Construction

In the twenty-first century, against the backdrop of globalization, many new trends have emerged in the development of the international community, among which two have drawn particular attention. First, globalization breaks down traditional geographical, economic, and cultural barriers among nation-states and partly weakens or deconstructs these countries’ sovereign political powers. Second, geocultural factors play an increasingly significant role in the construction of international geopolitics, geo-economy (e.g., regional integration), and inter-state relations. As cultural conflicts and competition become more frequent and intense than ever, culture, once merely auxiliary to politics and economy and of low political priority, has been elevated to become a factor of high political priority capable of shaping global politics. Undoubtedly, international relations today are still characterized mainly by politics that center on national interests, including national security. The international community keeps prioritizing political and security concerns over economic ones when considering relations among states. However, it is undeniable that the present era has, to a large extent, become an “era of culture” (Fu 2012). In this era, as global economic integration continues to deepen, the international community must come to terms with the fact that culture has become a prominent factor capable of shaping the international community, regional societies, and the interactions among countries. Cultural conflict, competition, exchange, and integration turn into critical variables that will either hinder or facilitate international relations, affecting the establishment of global order and the development of relations among countries and regions more profoundly.

In the meantime, the international community’s understanding of the importance of “culture” has grown over the years. Many countries and regions have placed great emphasis on their own culture to protect the harmonious coexistence of cultural tradition and diversity, defend cultural rights, and compete for cultural benefits. These are all suitable means to propel development and enhance their standing in the international community, setting a new trend in their cultural development under globalization. In this context, studies related to geoculture have begun to catch the attention of scholars in the field of international politics, including those specializing in international relations.

The theory of geoculture is derived from the development of geopolitical and geo-economic theories, two leading schools in the study of international relations. These two branches of learning systematize diplomatic-strategic relations and geographic-economic analyses of resources from a geospatial perspective to guide political decision-making. In contrast, the study of geoculture focuses more on how the cultural factors of a physical geographic region affect a country’s political decisions and foreign policies. But compared to geopolitics and geoeconomics, in which considerable research achievements have been made, progress is relatively slow and unimpressive in geocultural studies. There is little high-quality research output, and a relatively mature theory has yet to be built on its basis. Therefore, the study of geoculture has a long way to go before becoming a third pillar in the academic field of international politics on a par with the schools of geopolitics and geoeconomics. Nevertheless, international geopolitical studies are definitely headed in the direction of featuring such a tripartite configuration.

Since the 1980s and 1990s, cultural factors have become increasingly important in shaping international political and economic development and changes in the global landscape. After the September 11th attacks, the topic has attracted intense interest among researchers studying international political theories. Thus, not only is more in-depth research on geoculture and related theories from the political-sociological perspective needed for the subject’s own development but it can also broaden the horizons of studies in such areas as international politics, international relations, sociology, history, ethnology, religion, and others. By closely observing and examining the concept of geoculture and its underlying social constructs, such as religion, ethnicity, and historical traditions, we gain insights into its implicit or semi-implicit potency that has begun to surface and would probably “unsettle a pool of spring water.” Besides, it helps us achieve a more profound understanding of a wide range of issues facing all human beings today, such as religious conflicts, nationalism, ethnic conflicts, refugee crises, local wars, regional peace processes, inter-state relations, extremism, terrorism, and other international problems and political chaos. For these reasons, I hope that the research approach and theoretical construct on “geoculture and its social construction” in this small book will enrich the theoretical and practical studies of the disciplines mentioned above.

The first part of this book, based on previous works in geocultural studies, probes into the meaning, general and particular attributes, characteristics, structure, and categories of “geoculture,” along with other fundamental theoretical issues, by drawing on the theoretical and methodological framework of constructivism in international politics. The book proposes that geoculture is formed by the dual processes of geographical construction and social construction. It also argues that “political sensitivity” and “constructability” are the essential characteristics of geoculture, among other viewpoints. Following the approach of international political sociology, this part of the book also examines how ethnicity and religion, two dominant social factors in the Indochina Peninsula, have shaped the social construction of geoculture in the region, reflects on the geocultural characteristics of the peninsula and the countries in the region, and presents a brief discussion on the impact of geocultural issues on the global political order and regional geopolitics today.

The second part of the book analyzes the role ethnicity and religion play in the social construction of geoculture at both the national and supranational levels in the region. It suggests that shared ideas such as “ethnic identity,” “religious identity,” and “national identity,” and the relationship among them can fall into one of three different models: the “unary model,” the “binary model,” and the “ternary model.” Each has a constitutive effect on the cultural pattern of the international system. Therefore, regarding the construction of the culture of the international system, the book proposes that “structural idealism” should be “two-way constitutive,” which may further point toward an analytical approach to understanding the geopolitical phenomena in Southeast Asia, Asia, other regions, and even the world.

In short, the study of geoculture and its construction mechanism, especially in social terms, involves not only political-sociological perspectives related to religion and ethnicity, it should also open up a new perspective on the theory of constructivism in international relations studies.

The book adopts a logical framework informed by political sociology. Concentrating on how social elements and foundations impact politics, it examines how religion and ethnicity in particular figure into the construction of the political order of different countries, regions, and the contemporary world. Using the Indochina Peninsula of Southeast Asia as an example, the book engages in an in-depth discussion of the significance of religion and ethnicity, two especially “salient” social forces in the region, to the political construction at the national and supranational levels there.

Another theoretical starting point of the book is based on the reflection on Alexander Wendt’s constructivism.

Wendt’s constructivism brought a new perspective and paradigm to international political studies in the twentieth century after the debate over realism and liberalism. However, what is worth further considering is that Wendt’s theory of “structural idealism” has omissions and defects. As a variety of structuralism, it focuses only on how shared ideas at the supranational level of the international system have a top-down constitutive effect on the national level. However, it neglects the internal “shared ideas” of both states—the primary actors in the international system—and some complementary units acting on the system (all referred to as “geopolitical actors” in this book) that socially construct culture at the national and international system levels. What Wendt characterizes as the “Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian” cultures embedded in the international system are based on a top-down structural idealist analysis. But I believe that the structure of the culture of the international system involves not just such a one-way construction, it should also entail a bottom-up social construction from within the actors of the international system and their “Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian” cultural factors integral to the social construction of their geocultures. These factors are constructed by cultural traditions and social structures, for example, ethnicity and religion, that are formed within the actors of the international system over a long-term social and historical development. They, in turn, play a vanguard role in the construction at the level of states (or other geopolitical actors) before the “shared ideas” of the culture of the international system take effect. Therefore, the book proposes that the structural idealist model of constructing the culture of the international system should be “two-way constitutive.”

There is no doubt that the study of geoculture and its social construction will open up new horizons for the theories of international politics and international political sociology, for it will remind us that the “base layer” should not be overshadowed by the “upper layer” and the “top layer.” The elements of “Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian” cultures in the national and regional societies are like the manifested bodies or shadows of the three cultural giants from above. These “cultural shadows” are too ubiquitous inside the societies of the actors to be obscured by their other selves at the “higher” level of the international system.

It is undeniable that behind the framework of the “two-way constitutive” theory, there lies an idealist assumption: If the sovereign states or the majority of the geopolitical actors in today’s world generally upheld “Kantian” or “Lockean” values and actively engaged in constructing these two types of geoculture, the world would, in theory, increasingly avoid “Hobbesian” conflicts and tensions. Nonetheless, this idealist vision of the “Great Unity under Heaven,” never possible in reality, looks even more untenable in the face of today’s global religious revival. Just think of the lands under the threat of terrorism and extremism, the values held by some superpowers who enjoy stirring the pot by playing equivocal roles in regional situations to secure their positions and hegemonic interests, and the helpless and even hopeless eyes of the political, economic, and social refugees who have been displaced and left in desolation by wars, financial crises, or ethnic conflicts.

As a sociologist, I adhere to the value-neutral principle as much as possible in choosing this study’s approach, perspective, and stance. Besides, I attempt to glean theories, methods, and findings from a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, religion, ethnology, international politics, and international relations, while conducting the study mainly within the paradigm of political sociology. (I must admit that although I am equipped with the knowledge and some academic skills in these disciplines, none of them are sufficient.) Indeed, as professor Zhang Jing of Peking University puts it, speaking of political sociology, “the mainstream stance of its analysis is structural, macro, historical, comparative, and qualitative, which differs from positivist sociology that assumes objective constraints and independent variables” (Zhang 1998, 15–23).

According to Anthony Orum, an American political sociologist, culture is a critical concept of scholarly interest in his field. In the fourth edition of his book, Introduction to Political Sociology, Orum projects culture alongside power, institutions, and networks against the same backdrop as fundamental approaches to his research (Orum 2005, 4–5). He points out in his book that

culture, as a tool to be used for understanding the dynamics of societies, has become increasingly helpful for contemporary sociologists … the political dimensions of societies can be better understood by tracking the nature of their culture. One very visible way is in the form of nationalism that exists in different nations. Nationalism represents the form of culture that is peculiar to the territorial-bounded organizations of nations. (Orum 2005, 4–5)

In this book, the political-sociological analysis of the religious and ethnic dimensions of Indochinese countries of Southeast Asia will follow the same approach. However, in my discussion of such topics as “cross-border ethnicity,” “foreign ethnicity,” “ethnic identity,” and “religious identity,” I am using the concept of culture in a sense that goes beyond Orum’s definition, that is, “beliefs among large groups of people” (Orum 2005, 4). This would allow some of the political-sociological reflections presented in the book to have broader theoretical and practical import, and this particular approach to be applicable to the political-sociological study of the interactions between culture and power, power and society, society and politics, politics and country, different countries, and international relations and the international order.

Here I would like to justify my choice of research approach and angle for this study by quoting from the introduction to The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, co-edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott: