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Conflict, Cooperation and Leadership in the Mediterranean

European Political Entrepreneurs from the 1980s to the Arab Spring

by Ivan Ureta Vaquero (Author)
©2024 Monographs 258 Pages

Summary

This compelling book delves deep into the intricate tapestry of Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomacy, shedding light on the motivations that guided the actions of key political players from the 1980s to the Arab Spring. The author, on a challenging quest, identifies and interviews the very politicians and diplomats who shaped these relationships, uncovering a stark realism that superseded idealistic notions when crucial decisions were at stake. The author's focus turns to Spain, and to a lesser extent, France, as they navigate the intricate web of Euro-Mediterranean politics to gain greater diplomatic influence, regional power, and strategic leadership within the European Union and the southern Mediterranean rim.
They are portrayed as political brokers and entrepreneurs in the Mediterranean marketplace. In this thought-provoking work, the Mediterranean is portrayed as a transactional good, skillfully traded in all directions to achieve political, economic, and diplomatic goals. This book is a meticulously researched and compelling exploration of the complex relationships, interests, and maneuverings that shape the geopolitics of the Euro-Mediterranean region. It offers readers a new perspective on the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean politics focusing on Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics.

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Acknowledgements
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • This eBook can be cited
  • Table of Contents
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Graphics and Tables
  • Introduction
  • Mediterranean Politics
  • EEC/EU Foreign Policy and the Global Mediterranean Policy
  • The 5+5 Dialogue
  • The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
  • The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
  • The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC)
  • The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
  • Framing Euro-Mediterranean Politics, Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers
  • Realist-Constructivism
  • Political Entrepreneurship and Brokerage
  • Political Entrepreneurs
  • Political Brokers
  • The Mediterranean: A Profitable Opportunity
  • Unveiling Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers
  • Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis
  • Corpus Linguistics (CL)
  • Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
  • CL and CDA as Complementary Approaches
  • Contents
  • 1 Spain and the Great Gallop: Strategies of a Political Entrepreneur
  • 1.1 Spain’s European Ambitions and the French Response
  • 1.2 Trying to Build a New Image
  • 1.3 French Reactions
  • 1.4 Amateur Government Paving the Road for the Next Steps
  • 1.5 A Political Entrepreneur Looking for a Strategy
  • 1.6 The Spanish Gallopade: Looking for International Acknowledgement
  • 1.7 The Mediterranean Card
  • 1.8 The French Attitude
  • 1.9 Spain: Achieving Objectives
  • 1.10 Spain Sells the Mediterranean: A Threatening Political Discourse
  • 2 Lights and Shadows The Assertion of Spanish Leadership in the International Arena during the Aznar Era, 1996–2004
  • 2.1 Discussing the Paternity of Spain’s Foreign Policy
  • 2.2 The Baseline of Spain’s New Foreign Policy
  • 2.3 Aznar and the Mediterranean: The First Step
  • 2.4 Aznar’s New Foreign Policy: Changing Methodology
  • 2.5 Mutating Axes: The Atlantic- Mediterranean Approach
  • 2.6 Aznar versus the EU? A Converging Attitude, Different Approaches
  • 2.7 Aznar’s Strong Political Stances and the End of His Mandate
  • 3 Zapatero’s Attempt to Reposition Spain in the Mediterraean
  • 3.1 Back to the Mediterranean. Back to the Roots
  • 3.2 The Alliance of Civilizations: Building on the Sand
  • 3.3 A Political Broker Managing an Abstract Political Opportunity
  • 3.4 Lack of Clarity and a Fainted Strategy: Missed Opportunities?
  • 3.5 European Reactions
  • 4 The Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy and the Mediterranean Frustrated Ambitions, Failed Leadership
  • 4.1 Jacques Chirac’s Foreign Policy and the Arab World
  • 4.2 Sarkozy and the Mediterranean Window: Launching the Mediterranean Union
  • 4.3 European Reactions
  • 4.4 Europeanizing the Project: Rebuilding Trust
  • 4.5 Initial Reactions from the South
  • 4.6 Spain Becomes Home to the UfM
  • 4.7 The Benefits of the Union for the Mediterranean or for the South?
  • 4.8 Europe and the Future of the UfM
  • 5 Migration, Security and Public Opinion in the Euro-Mediterranean Region Challenging Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers
  • 5.1 General Migratory Trends
  • 5.1.1 Migration in the Mediterranean
  • 5.2 Gambling on the Needs and Problems of Southern Mediterranean Countries
  • 5.3 Trying to Manage Migration: The Fundamental Gap
  • 5.4 Migration and the Economic Cycle: Triggering National Fears, Evidencing Multilateral Deficiencies
  • 5.5 Migration and Public Opinion: National Politics Challenging International Projects
  • 6 The Long Cultivation of the Arab Spring
  • 6.1 Making Friends by Securing the House
  • 6.2 Understanding “center/s-periphery/ies” Relations and Interactions
  • 6.3 Heirs, Political Mortgages and “forced” Allies
  • 6.3.1 Libya
  • 6.3.2 Tunisia
  • 6.4 A Surprising Arab Spring?
  • 6.4.1 Revolutions Propelled by the International Financial System
  • 6.5 EU’s Response, Scope and Outcomes
  • Conclusions
  • Political Entrepreneurship Cycle (PEC)
  • Creation
  • Design
  • Implementation
  • Institutionalization
  • Evaluation
  • References
  • Appendix

Graphics and Tables

(A) Graphics

  1. Graphic 1. European Councils. Conclusions of the Presidency, 1993–1995.
  2. Graphic 2. European Councils. Conclusions of the Presidency. 1996–2000.
  3. Graphic 3. José María Aznar. Discourses. 1983–2013.
  4. Graphic 4. European Councils. Conclusions of the Presidency. 2001–2004.
  5. Graphic 5. PSOE 2008–2011. Electoral Program.
  6. Graphic 6. AoC Madrid 2008–Istanbul 2009.
  7. Graphic 7. European Councils. Conclusions of the Presidency. 2005–2008.
  8. Graphic 8. Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean and the ME.
  9. Graphic 9. Sarkozy. Discourse. Toulon. 2007.
  10. Graphic 10. Declaration of Marseille. Variables.
  11. Graphic 11. European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency. 2009–2013.
  12. Graphic 12. International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population.
  13. Graphic 13. Annual Rate of Change. Migrant Stock % in Spain, Italy, France and Malta.
  14. Graphic 14. Annual Rate of Change. Migrant Stock % in Europe.
  15. Graphic 15. International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population in Europe.
  16. Graphic 16. Spain. Public Opinion.
  17. Graphic 17. Italy. Public Opinion.
  18. Graphic 18. France. Public Opinion.
  19. Graphic 19. Malta. Public Opinion.
  20. Graphic 20. Compared Migration. Spain, Italy, France and Malta.
  21. Graphic 21. Aggregated EU.
  22. Graphic 22. Trend-lines, Europe.
  23. Graphic 23. Ideal Political Entrepreneur.
  24. Graphic 24. Leaders. Behavior and Characteristics.
  25. Graphic 25. Long-Term Comparative Analysis. CE Public Speech. 1993–2013.
  26. Graphic 26. Trend-Line. Evolution. Public Opinion. 1997–2011.

(B) Tables

  1. Tables 1. Distribution and Status. UfM Projects. August 2012.

(C) Figures

Introduction

The so-called “Arab Spring” exploded amid incredulous eyes. Politicians, scholars and the public opinion alike reacted with surprise – seemingly these uprisings were unexpected. In actual fact Western governments reacted slowly and cautiously prioritising maintaining a certain order where long-term collaboration, business cooperation and strategic alliances were needed. Almost from one day to the next, the slant of newspaper headlines and optimistic socio-economic forecasts changed; heads of state of North African countries like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Ghadafi began to be described as dictators by Western Media.

European countries were very aware of two important facts of the region: these governments and their leaders were not adhering to democratic principles in the way that they are applied and understood in Western societies, and their economic structures as well as their unbalanced and divided societies were posing big challenges to the future. Already in 1999 Le Monde Diplomatique published an article titled: Notre ami Ben Ali: Dictature à la Tunisienne (LB, 1999). The potential for conflict was therefore very high but strengthening economic and diplomatic relations with dubious regimes were crucial to ensure Europe’s prosperity and security.

In order to better understand and demonstrate this I embarked upon a difficult path aimed at identifying and interviewing some of the politicians and diplomats who were most involved in the designing and developing of Euro-Mediterranean political and diplomatic relations. In the following chapters, most of those interviewed recognised that realism was the strongest element driving political and economic decisions vis-à-vis the southern rim of the Mediterranean. Idealism was put behind when important decisions were about to be taken.

In acknowledging the rampant socio-economic deficiencies and long-standing struggles experienced by North African countries since the achievement of their “independence”, one question arises: How did these revolts not start earlier? The script was not written. The outcomes were foreseeable.

The central research question that I want to address is the following: Was the Arab Spring somehow induced by long-term forces led by Western geo-political and economic interests and initiatives in coalition with North African elites?

In line with the precedent research question, this book aims more specifically at understanding how Spain, and to a lesser extent France, have been implementing and managing policies and mechanisms to lead Euro-Mediterranean politics in order to achieve greater diplomatic influence, regional power and strategic leadership within the EU and the southern Mediterranean rim.

I consider these stakeholders as political brokers and entrepreneurs, whose natural market is the Mediterranean. Though I accept the rich cultural, historical, social and political values of the Mediterranean, I consider these factors to have been used and manipulated in order to construct a fictitious sphere of cooperation and achieve economic and security objectives. Accordingly, in this context, I view the Mediterranean as a transactional good that has been used and traded multi-directionally for political, economic and diplomatic goals.

Details

Pages
258
Year
2024
ISBN (PDF)
9783034348287
ISBN (ePUB)
9783034348294
ISBN (Softcover)
9783034343459
DOI
10.3726/b21588
Language
English
Publication date
2024 (May)
Keywords
constructivism Mediterranean European Union Middle East Arab Spring realism International relations diplomacy migration conflict cooperation political entrepreneurs security political communication governance
Published
Lausanne, Berlin, Bruxelles, Chennai, New York, Oxford, 2024. 258 pp., 27 fig. b/w, 1 table

Biographical notes

Ivan Ureta Vaquero (Author)

Ivan Ureta is Head of Executive Education at the University of Applied Sciences of Southern Switzerland. He holds a PhD in Business History and a PhD in International Political Economy (King’s College London). He has been affiliated to IE Business School, University of Cambridge and University of Oxford amongst others. He served as an expert at the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

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Title: Conflict, Cooperation and Leadership in the Mediterranean