Effects of German Industrialization on Turkish-German Military-Strategic Relations (1815-1929)

1.1. The Uniqueness of German Industrialization

One of the unique features of German Industrialization is that it did not happen in a systematic way. The German Industrial Revolution did not happen on a specific date or in a short period of time, but spread over a long period of time and over a wide geography. German Industrialization has traces in every corner of the scattered German geography.

Some of the driving forces playing an active role in German Industrialization are important developments such as resource management, communication revolution, demographic revolution, transportation revolution, agricultural revolution, structural and financial innovations, public regulations, scientific and technological initiatives, which are tried to be examined in detail in this study. The disorganization of these driving forces makes the German Industrial Revolution a multi-piece puzzle. The German Industrial Revolution is the result of developments that took place in different locations and at different times. In order to understand an industrialization of this nature, it is necessary to examine the developments in each time period in itself, if necessary also regionaly. When speaking of the German Industrial Revolution, it is important to keep in mind that conditions in the East Elbe were not the same as in Saxony or in the Ruhr at any time in the 19th century. While the traces of German Industrialization can be found in some parts of the states such as Prussia and Saxony since the end of the 18th century, it is not possible to talk about a similar industrialization in the East Elbe or Württemberg at the same time. The enlarged Prussia in 1871 had 60 % of the population in the empire and 64 % of the imperial lands.¹ There are quite a lot differences between examining the developments in the 19th century Germany in the perspective of Prussia and in the perspective of Baden or Dresden.

In 1789, when the French Revolution took place, there were 314 independent political regions in Germany, and each region in this vast geography was differentiated from each other not only politically but also economically.² This differentiation enabled the regions to have different development rates and different orientations. While talking about 19th century Germany, it is quite variable in which year and between which borders Germany would be evaluated. Modern studies examine German territory within its borders in 1871, but it is often overlooked that Alsace-Lorraine, rich in coal and iron, which had a huge impact on industrialization, was not a German territory before this date. The lands owned by the German Empire in 1871 was the same neither with the lands in Holy Roman Empire, nor with the lands in the German Confederation, nor with the lands in the North German Confederation.³

When the German Industrial Revolution took place cannot be expressed with an exact date. It is generally accepted that the “take-off”⁴ period of German Industrialization, in Rostow’s words, took place around the 1850s. However, in the mentioned period, there was neither a central administration nor a coordinated power governing a single German country with certain geographical borders.

The transition from an agrarian economy to a manufacturing economy, as a result of the lack of a central authority and dispersed order, had already begun in some parts of Germany; therefore, the pace of industrialization varied from region to region, from state to state. When examining German Industrialization, it is not possible to give an exact date for German Industrialization by focusing on a single region. Despite these impasses, there was a factor that kept all this mess in harmony with an invisible thread, which was the “organizational revolution” that made the German Industrial Revolution fast, effective and surprising. As a result of Germany’s organizational revolution in the 19th century, production technologies and the speed of transformation into a market economy developed simultaneously in tremendous harmony. While production increased on the one hand, consumption also supported this production and this mobility spread throughout the geography with the transportation revolution. This is a phenomenon that attracts the attention of many researchers. Both economists and economic historians have examined the growth problem in industrial economies. In particular, Hoffman’s and Rostow’s views on this subject are interesting. Hoffman argues that the industrialization process always follows the same model and claims that the economy passes through four basic stages in the industrialization process.⁵

According to Hoffman, the first phase of industrialization is characterized by a very high amount of final product. This final product can be a textile product such as cotton or a food industry product such as flour or sugar. In this phase, the amount of heavy industry products such as pig iron and machinery is slightly less. At this stage, the ratio of consumer goods to capital goods⁶ is 5 to 1. In the second phase of industrialization, the final products produced in the textile and food industry are still the predominant part but pig iron products and engineering products are increasing rapidly. At this stage, the ratio of consumer goods to capital goods is 2.5 to 1. In the third phase of industrialization, consumer goods such as textiles and capital goods such as engineering products are almost equal, but capital goods have a greater tendency to increase. At this stage, the ratio of consumer goods to capital goods is 1 to 1. In the fourth phase of industrialization, the amount of capital goods exceeds consumer goods.⁷

Hoffman argues that the first industry to develop in the industrialization process is the consumer goods industry.⁸ He also argues that as industrialization takes place, the ratio of added value from consumer goods to capital goods decreases, and over time, capital goods grow at a faster rate than consumer goods.⁹ While Hoffmann’s theory is like this, Rostow’s economic growth theory is divided into five phases.¹⁰

According to Rostow, the first phase is the traditional society phase. In this phase, economy is dependent on agriculture. Trade rate is very low. Society does not have a vision for technology and global markets. Society has no expectation of economic well-being, neither for themselves nor for future generations. The second phase is the phase in which the prerequisites for take-off happen. In this phase, the economic, technical, social and political conditions of the first phase, lasting a century or more, are gradually established and only after this formation complete, transition from a superior agricultural economy to a superior production economy can be made. During this stage, society begins to produce and use technology gradually. Agricultural production increases, people begin to earn money. A tax system and a state authority is established, educational institutions become widespread. Society abandons the regional perspective and begins to look at the country as a whole, even looking abroad becomes a fact. The third phase is the take-off phase. In this phase, an intense and automatic growth takes place in a short period of 20–30 years. The share of the investment rate in the national income increases from 5 % to more than 10 % and vital advances are made in production techniques. Industrialization begins to appear. Workers and institutions begin to adapt to new industrial sectors. The entrepreneurial class is born. The social and economic structure changes radically. The fourth phase is the phase of progress towards maturity. In this phase, self-sufficiency occurs. In this phase, which takes a long time, the economy reaches maturity to grow on its own. The ratio of investments and savings is large enough to automate economic growth. New leading sectors develop, the number of agricultural and rural populations decreases, the country’s foreign trade structure changes radically. The living standards of the society improve, the use of technology increases, the national economy grows and diversifies. In the fifth stage, there is the period of high mass consumption. In this phase, economy fully adapts to the capitalist system. Mass production and mass consumption take place. The society has a surplus of money to spend, and the new leading sectors are born that make the society make mass consumption.¹¹

According to Rostow, the phase called “take-off” is vital. Rostow claims that this phase took place in Britain between 1783 and 1802, in France and Belgium between 1830 and 1860, and in Germany after 1850 (no end date).¹² Of course, it should be noted that Rostow’s economic growth model is one of the most criticized models.

While economists such as Schumpeter, Colin Clark, and Kuznets argue that industrial growth is a normal process under the influence of economic fluctuations and is not stimulated by a sudden burst of extraordinary expansion, Rostow necessarily looks for an extraordinary impetus in the “take-off” phase. For example, according to Rostow, the take-off in German Industrialization became possible with the driving force of the railways. Kuznets, on the other hand, attributes the German industry’s overtaking of British industry in some areas to the fast-growing industries in Britain. According to Kuznets, rapidly booming industries end up with a rapid decline and in the longer run are surpassed by their steadily growing competitors.¹³ The case of Britain is an example for Kuznets’ theory.

It is possible to emphasize once again the originality of the German Industrial Revolution by considering various economic growth theories. Moreover, what makes the German Industrial Revolution different is that it does not have a texture that fully integrates with these generalizations. Germany could not advance towards its goal in a systematic way by placing it on its investments. Its cultivated lands were devastated, its population decreased, and it could not create capital accumulation due to the wars that continued for centuries. The gains gained were lost in a moment in the war environment. For example, in the first phases mentioned by Rostow, even in the agriculture-oriented period, when he predicted that the society was not yet technically developed, Germans made significant contributions to knowledge and technology, however there was no investment environment provided to evaluate them. The Magdeburg experiments of the 17th century are just a small example of this.¹⁴

When the Germans showed signs of industrialization or engaged in technological inventions, there was always an external threat or political turmoil that drove them back. In this way, German Industrialization was permanently pushed out of systemic developments. For this reason, seeking the answer of the German Industrial Revolution in formulated schemes may not yield satisfactory results. It would be a more correct approach to examine each detail in itself and induce it. The characteristically different nature of the German Industrial Revolution is one of the main reasons why its breaking points are open to debate.

German Industrialization faced different obstacles from other industrialized countries. Until the 19th century, Germany’s lack of an administrative-centered economic union was one of the biggest obstacles to its industrialization. The commercial traffic that should have occurred in Germany’s internal market had been slowed down by numerous customs barriers, currency differences and commercial monopolies, and in many cases the monopoly had been the public administration itself. In particular, the border kingdoms often preferred to trade with their non-German neighbors through more convenient routes, rather than turning to the German internal market by crossing the German mountains and rivers, and paying several customs duties. In such an environment, the concept of “domestic market” could not carry either a moral or a holistic value. On the one hand, wars and on the other hand, the fact that the people only earn enough to live, due to the absolutist policies of the princes, prevented the formation of the capital accumulation necessary for industrialization. This situation created a decrease in the purchasing power of the population in general, and the consequent low consumption was the main reason for the traders to move away from the domestic market.¹⁵

It is possible to attribute the reason for the absolutist policies to the lack of political unity of Germany. The lack of a centralized structure allowed the principalities to rule society on their terms. Even in the 18th century, this fragmented and dispersed order continued, and in an environment where there was no political unity, neither a central administrative structure, nor the concept of nation, nor a domestic market trend could be achieved. Administrative elements in the Holy Roman Empire consisted of the judiciary named Reichskammergericht in Wetzlar (Supreme Court), the Eternal Congress in Regensburg, the Reichshofkammer in Vienna, and the emperor himself in Vienna.¹⁶ The effect of these were at a level between mediocre and nonexistent.

Adding to all these negativities, the tragic wars supported by the regional powers who wanted to take advantage of Germany’s political turmoil, the effect of the ongoing obstacles became devastating. In the 1630s, when the Thirty Years’ War was raging, the urban population of Brandenburg, whose capital was Berlin, fell abruptly from 113,500 to 34,000, and its rural population fell from 300,000 to 75,000. Almost a third of the population lost their lives or were forced to migrate and cultivated lands were burned and destroyed. While they were about to recover after the war, Sweden, the prominent military power of Northern Europe in the 1670s, occupied Brandenburg again with the French. However the Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William, known as the Great Elector, was able to defeat them this time by maneuvering better, but still the war had a great impact on the public.¹⁷ The people were systematically fragmented both as a population and psychologically. The war did not only happen among the soldiers, but most of the time the people were directly targeted. For the people in German lands, war meant forced migration, poverty, rulelessness and death. What happened in the Thirty Years’ War created a deep fear of invasion on the people.¹⁸

The wars in which both rich and poor were brutally murdered, escape was prohibited and misery prevailed, pushed the Germans to support militarizm. The impact of these wars did not diminish over the centuries. What Germany lived through at that time resulted in the people who needed to participate in production to be wasted in wars, and moreover, this turmoil provided a stable continuity.

By the 18th century, the German geography was not at peace, but in turmoil again. Political division had made the wars that broke out in the German geography in the 18th century a habit rather than an exception. The possibility of war on German soil was always felt, and this hindered the growth of interregional economic independence. Due to the protection psychology created by the wars, the expenditures on the military increased, and both the economy and raw materials started to be used primarily for the military.¹⁹ Between 1740 and 1786, 70 %–80 %, some years even up to 90 %, of public expenditures in Prussia were made for the military, and the number of soldiers in the army was increased regularly by new recruitment plans. As a result of these developments, the Prussian army became the largest army in Europe in terms of soldier/population ratio, however, this result was achieved as a result of considerable financial sacrifices. Under Frederick the Great, officers were not even allowed to marry because they had no money to pay their widows in the event of death.²⁰

In the 19th century, the situation was not so different. This time, a Napoleon hurricane emerged that engulfed Europe, and this hurricane completely changed the order of the German states. Napoleon attracted the attention of the German states not only with his military successes but also with the successful reforms he carried out in France, therefore he encouraged the German states to voluntarily join the French Empire directly or indirectly. This situation showed its effect quite clearly. The fact that Napoleon followed an expansionist policy and promised reforms to the places under his rule turned the fragmented structure in Germany into a complete political turmoil. For example, while Prussia confronted Napoleon, its close neighbor Saxony preferred to stand next to Napoleon. Likewise, many German states in the west of the Rhine entrusted themselves to Napoleon’s protection and reforms, establishing the Rhine Confederation instead of being incorporated into the Holy Roman Empire. There were even volunteers from the Rhine region who joined Napoleon’s army.²¹ The establishment of the Rheinbund (Rhine Confederation) by 16 German states,²² including important names such as Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, erased the Holy Roman Germanic Empire, which had been ineffective for a long time, from the stage of history in every respect on 6 August 1806.

While the tragic wars in previous centuries were effective with their military and social consequences, Napoleon’s influence in the commercial field was at least at a level that could compete with the effects in the military and social fields. Napoleon’s commercial system was one of the biggest obstacles in front of both the German states that were not affiliated with the Rhine Confederation and the domestic producers who were trying to grow.²³ King of Prussia Friedrich William sent an ultimatum to France demanding its withdrawal from Germany and declared war on France in September 1806.²⁴ The French army had been fighting for a long time. Moreover, Napoleon was enlarging his army day by day, both because of his preparation for a great war that might occur against Britain and his enthusiasm to expand the borders of French Empire in Europe. On the contrary the Prussian army had been waiting for reform for a long time and it was unprepared. Thus, the French army defeated the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena on October 14, 1806. After the war, Prussia was forced to sign the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. On the occasion of this peace, Prussia had to give all its lands in the west of the Elbe and some eastern regions to France, and agreed to limit its army to 40,000 soldiers. Moreover, Prussia was punished with a compensation payment and forced to provide human and financial aid for Napoleon’s future campaigns.²⁵

Since the Treaty of Tilsit did not produce sustainable results, this defeat forced Prussia to make a series of reforms. Prussia launched a rapid reform programme, and started it from the army with the help of pioneering leaders such as Scharnhorst ve Gneisenau.²⁶ Serfdom was abolished in 1807, peasants were liberated (Bauernbefreiung), provincial authorities were appointed to the cities to govern themselves (Stadteordung), trade regulations were made (Handels und Gewerbegestzgebung), and all these were integrated with the renewed tax system.²⁷ Innate status groups were removed, nobles could do middle-class jobs, and liberated peasants became eligible to buy their lands. As can be expected, particularly this reform accelerated the economy in the long run by increasing the capitalist activity in the geography. The education system, which had been developing since the 18th century, was further developed with technical education and higher education, and the spread of this advanced education throughout Prussia enabled the transformation of the existing workforce into an educated workforce on behalf of industrializing Germany in the long run.

Napoleon was afraid of revolts in Europe and had an opinion that Russia was triggering the revolts. He saw waging war on Russia as a solution in order to prevent revolts. So, he invaded Russia in 1812, and it was the first step which ended a unique period. Thinking that Napoleon was successful in his offensive operations, he entered Russia and even occupied Moscow. However, the resistance of the Russian Emperor Alexander I to make a treaty, the French army’s inability to withstand the cold Russian climate and the French army’s supply problems ended up with the loss of power for Frenchs. This situation gave the coalition, which was waiting to end Napoleon’s domination in Europe, the opportunity it was looking for. While invading Russia, Napoleon had amassed an army of over 600,000 soldiers, made up of French military and allied support, but in December he returned with 93,000 troops at best.²⁸