Catholic Theology and the Dispute over the Image of Science

Introduction

Whether theology is a science is a question that is hundreds of years old. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) already asked that question in the Middle Ages in his famous work Summa Theologiae.¹ Regardless of Thomas Aquinas’ ingenuity in finding an answer, the fact that such an issue is still being worked on today may indicate that his approach or solution is no longer satisfying to modern-day theologians or philosophers of religion. The dawn of the new image of science (i.e., since Galileo) has called into question the Aristotelian concept of science and, thus, the old claim of the scientific profile of theology. In that situation, it is not surprising that the doubts have repercussions on the long-undisputed credibility and authority of theology, especially in the public and academic-scientific community, that is, universities.

Obviously, criticism of the old claim has not deterred theologians and philosophers with a great interest in religion from arguing for the need to justify the scientific profile of theology through a nontraditional approach. Even so, there is no consensus among them about how it should be done.² For some people, that situation can arouse curiosity about the reasons or motives of theologians and philosophers of religion for such a need.

Reeves believes that it may have something to do with a fear of losing recognition from the academic-scientific community. He clearly states that

[I]‌n my own training in science and religion at Boston University, I was struck by how many science and religion scholars were attempting to use the authority of science to secure the legitimacy of theology as a discipline. Theology had long struggled in the twentieth century to find a secure place in public research universities, for it seemed to rely upon faith claims that are problematic from a philosophical point of view.³

←11 | 12→If that is really the case, then it is the “political” education system that has forced theologians and philosophers of religion to find out how to work “scientifically” in their own area. From that point of view, being scientific (viz., being part of a science) is all important. What is not part of science or cannot function according to scientific standards is not worthy to pursue at universities.

Although it sounds reasonable, Reeves sees that such a policy can also be problematic. It presupposes and claims to know the essence of science. Because of his sympathy for the (socio-) historical approach, he rejects such a typical essentialist discourse, contending that there is, in history, a complexity in the term “science” as well as in the term “religion” (i.e., theology). This complexity, consequently, renders the discourse about the essence of “science” or “religion” pointless. Even so, he concludes that it is still possible to promote dialogue between, and progress in, science and religion “by focusing on specific religious topics as they connect to particular scientific theories.”⁴

What Reeves seems to be suggesting here is that there is a clear distinction between science and religion (i.e., theology) and yet, that instead of wasting time discussing what makes science a science, or theology a theology, it is better to work on specific problems within certain disciplines and learn from each other. Only then will the university become a place where interdisciplinary networking is possible. From that perspective, it is no longer “being scientific” that decides the affiliation of a particular discipline with the universities, but its ability to cooperate across disciplines and make progress.

Without a doubt, Reeves’ anti-essentialist position is noteworthy and his interest in dialogue between and progress in science and theology deserves credit. Still, generally speaking, it sounds strange to use a technical term like “science” (or “theology”) in a work that is supposed to be a scientific work without first explaining what the term means. If he believes that science and religion are different—and he does believe so, then there must be a demarcating line between them. Contrary to his claim, some philosophers of science are still interested in the demarcation problem in the current discussion.⁵ Exploring this is certainly not an easy task, but it can and must be done. Otherwise, an objection to the scientific status of theology makes absolutely no sense. For that reason, a kind of ←12 | 13→essentialist discourse is still needed, although it should not be conducted in the traditional way.⁶

That being said, it is hard to disagree with Reeves’ comment about the fear of loss of recognition from the academic-scientific community on the part of theologians or philosophers of religion. This kind of psychological consideration can possibly be one reason why they feel obliged to protect the scientific profile of theology, but it certainly should not be the only reason.

In conjunction with this, it has been argued that the main reason theology still qualifies as science, and that the objection to it is unacceptable, is that the arguments underlying such an objection are usually not convincing enough.⁷ Commonly, there are three things that are believed to distinguish theology from science⁸: a. the source of knowledge (viz., theology is based on the revelation of the transcendent God known by faith); b. the object (viz., theology has God as its object); and c. the truth claim (viz., theology is about certainty guaranteed by the Scriptures as God’s Word). Hence, it is an appeal to a supernatural entity (i.e., God) and its authority, or to put it differently, to metaphysics, that distinguishes science and nonscience,⁹ and that usually leads the critics to reject the scientific profile of theology. For some theologians and philosophers of religion, this kind of objection has a naturalist bias, that is, a hostile attitude toward metaphysics, and it is flawed and unacceptable. To argue against such an objection, they normally try to point out that science is even based on metaphysics, and, with such a conception of a metaphysics-based science, they seek to justify the scientific ←13 | 14→profile of theology.¹⁰ This view, obviously, must have taken a particular philosophical position, that is, a nonnaturalist position.¹¹

It must be admitted that bringing philosophical considerations into the scientific enterprise is something that not all professional scientists agree with. However, some of them can easily accept the idea that science needs philosophical insights,¹² or that some ideas of modern physics can find their roots in the metaphysical ideas of ancient Greek thinkers.¹³ On that account, it wouldn’t be preposterous to say that speaking of metaphysics is somehow helpful in science, especially in the context of scientific discovery. Even so, those metaphysics-friendly scientists would not suggest that metaphysics must therefore be regarded as an integral part of scientific knowledge. For them, science and metaphysics can and must remain different without necessarily being hostile to one another.

Considering all this, two consequences can be drawn. First, there is a need for a philosophy (of science) that can better explain, even to scientists, what really happens within science. As mentioned previously, this has provoked a wide range of discussions and, perhaps, will always do so. But it shouldn’t be a problem, because the important thing is to find a better argument or explanation, not the last word. Still, when scientists, even those with an interest in the role of metaphysics in science, recognize the difference between science and metaphysics, it can suggest that a philosophy that only creates confusion between science and metaphysics must come under suspicion.

Second, in view of the distinction between science and metaphysics, the old claim for the scientific profile of theology is called into question. That is because theology uses metaphysical notions (e.g.,, God, angel, demon, creation, grace, sin) or metaphysical statements to communicate, notions that are not of concern to science.

So, does it mean that theologians should simply give up the old claim? The answers can be varied. For theologians who see theology as a kind of wisdom rather than science, the objection to the old claim can leave their position intact ←14 | 15→and, instead, be seen as a confirmation of their own position; however, that is not a reason to exclude theology from the universities.¹⁴ For theologians (and philosophers of religion) who have an interest in salvaging the old claim at any cost, the objection can be considered an intellectual challenge. This can be seen as an apologetic project. For theologians who value progress, the objection can be accepted without difficulties. They, with a critical spirit, accept the idea that theology is not a science, given the available arguments, but at the same time they can show promising theological research that can bring progress.

This work deals with that last position. It searches for explanations as to why it is difficult, if not impossible, for (Catholic) theology to be (regarded as) a science and why it is still possible to speak of rationality in the context of Catholic theology. For that purpose, this work is divided into four chapters.

First Chapter: Catholic Theology. This chapter gives a context for this work. First of all, it will be argued that it is important to refer the issue directly to Catholic theology. As a consequence, some sort of essentialist approach is inevitable, as it searches for certain elements that can possibly describe Catholic theology. Only then can the claim of the scientific character of Catholic theology be critically assessed, that is, what makes it difficult to consider Catholic theology a science.

Second Chapter: Demarcation of Science. The argument of this chapter, in principle, lies in the need to take the demarcation problem seriously. The current debate within the theoretical physicists’ community about the scientific status of their research programs has implications for the understanding of science. And because there is still no consensus among professional scientists (in this case: physicists) themselves about what can be called science or “scientific,” assessing the claim of the scientific profile of Catholic theology is more difficult. Given that, a demarcation between science and nonscience, on the one hand, is still necessary, and, on the other hand, it should be undertaken by philosophers of science rather than by professional scientists.