Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance

Table Of Contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• About the Author
• About the Book
• This eBook can be cited
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• List of Symbols
• 1 Introduction
• 1.1 Motivation and Objectives
• 1.2 Outline
• 2 Characteristics of Ownership Structure and Performance
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Concentration of Ownership
• 2.2.1 Preliminary Considerations
• 2.2.2 Ownership Concentration Measures
• 2.2.2.1 Categorical Concentration Measures
• 2.2.2.2 Continuous Concentration Measures
• 2.3 Identity of Owners
• 2.3.1 Preliminary Considerations
• 2.3.2 Owner Typology
• 2.3.2.1 Individual Investors
• 2.3.2.2 Insiders
• 2.3.2.3 Corporations
• 2.3.2.4 Financial Investors
• 2.3.2.5 Commercial Banks
• 2.3.2.6 Government
• 2.4 Corporate Performance
• 2.4.1 Performance Dimensions
• 2.4.2 Performance Measures
• 2.4.2.1 Capital Market Performance
• 2.4.2.2 Accounting Performance
• 3 Theoretical Framework
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Theory Base
• 3.2.1 Early Approaches and Roots of Agency Theory
• 3.2.2 Agency Theory
• 3.2.2.1 Origin of Agency Conflicts
• 3.2.2.2 The Shareholder-Management Conflict
• 3.2.2.3 Consequences From Shareholder-Management Conflicts
• 3.2.2.4 Agency Control Mechanisms
• 3.2.3 Summary
• 3.3 The Concept of Ownership Concentration and Performance
• 3.3.1 Effects of Ownership Concentration on Performance
• 3.3.2 Reverse Effects of Performance on Ownership Concentration
• 3.3.3 Summary and Hypotheses Development
• 3.4 The Concept of Owner Identity and Performance
• 3.4.1 Individual Investor Ownership
• 3.4.1.1 Effects of Individual Investor Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.1.2 Reverse Effects on Individual Investor Ownership
• 3.4.1.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 3.4.2 Insider Ownership
• 3.4.2.1 Effects of Insider Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.2.2 Reverse Effects on Insider Ownership
• 3.4.2.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 3.4.3 Intercorporate Ownership
• 3.4.3.1 Effects of Intercorporate Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.3.2 Reverse Effects on Intercorporate Ownership
• 3.4.3.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 3.4.4 Financial Investor Ownership
• 3.4.4.1 Effects of Financial Investor Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.4.2 Reverse Effects on Financial Investor Ownership
• 3.4.4.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 3.4.5 Bank Ownership
• 3.4.5.1 Effects of Bank Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.5.2 Reverse Effects on Performance
• 3.4.5.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 3.4.6 Government Ownership
• 3.4.6.1 Effects of Government Ownership on Performance
• 3.4.6.2 Reverse Effects on Government Ownership
• 3.4.6.3 Summary and Hypothesis Development
• 4 Related Literature
• 4.1 Introduction
• 4.2 Moderating Factors
• 4.2.1 Corporate Governance System
• 4.2.2 Variable Measurement and Data Quality
• 4.2.3 Methodology
• 4.3 Review of Existing Studies
• 4.3.1 Previous Research on Ownership Concentration and Performance
• 4.3.1.1 Studies Modeling a One-Way Causation
• 4.3.1.2 Studies Addressing Endogeneity of Ownership
• 4.3.1.3 Multicountry Studies
• 4.3.1.4 Summary
• 4.3.2 Previous Research on Owner Identity
• 4.3.2.1 Individual Investor Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.2 Insider Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.3 Intercorporate Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.4 Financial Investor Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.5 Bank Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.6 Government Ownership and Performance
• 4.3.2.7 Summary
• 5 Research Design
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 Data
• 5.2.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
• 5.2.2 Variables Used
• 5.2.2.1 Ownership Variables
• 5.2.2.2 Performance Variables
• 5.2.2.3 Control Variables
• 5.2.2.4 Summary
• 5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
• 5.3 Model
• 5.3.1 Model Structure
• 5.3.2 Modeling Aspects in the Ownership-Performance Relation
• 5.3.2.1 Endogeneity of Ownership Structure
• 5.3.2.2 Linearity of Ownership Effects
• 5.3.2.3 Timing of Effects
• 5.4 Econometric Approach
• 5.4.1 Advantages and Limitations of Panel Data Sets
• 5.4.2 Fundamental Panel Methods
• 5.4.2.1 Pooled OLS Estimation
• 5.4.2.2 Fixed- and Random-Effects Estimation
• 5.4.2.3 Choice of the Appropriate Estimation Method
• 5.4.3 Advanced Panel Methods
• 5.4.3.1 Pooled 2SLS Estimation
• 5.4.3.2 Within-2SLS Estimation
• 5.4.4 Summary
• 6 Empirical Analyses
• 6.1 Ownership Concentration Effects
• 6.1.1 Base Case
• 6.1.1.1 Linear Within-Regression Results
• 6.1.1.2 Summary
• 6.1.2 Variations of the Base Case
• 6.1.2.1 Instrumental Variable Regression Results
• 6.1.2.2 Nonlinear and Piecewise-Linear Regression Results
• 6.1.2.3 Restricted Cubic Spline Regression Results
• 6.1.2.4 Summary
• 6.2 Owner Identity Effects
• 6.2.1 Identity of General Shareholder Base
• 6.2.2 Summary
• 6.3 Concentration and Identity Interaction Effects
• 6.3.1 Identity of the Largest Owner
• 6.3.2 Identity and Stake Size of the Largest Owner
• 6.3.3 Summary
• 6.4 Summary and Discussion of Results
• 7 Conclusion
• Appendices
• A.1 Previous Research on Ownership and Performance
• A.2 Pooled OLS Regression Results
• A.3 Random-Effects Regression Results
• A.4 Pooled 2SLS Regression Results
• References